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We examine demands for rewards and punishments in a simple
proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a
fixed-sized pie. According to the 2 × 2 design, the responder is or is
not given a costly option of increasing or decreasing the proposer’s pay-
off. We find substantial demands for both punishments and rewards.
While rewards alone have little influence on cooperation, punishments
have some. When the two are combined the effect on cooperation is
dramatic, suggesting that rewards and punishments are complements
in producing cooperation. Providing new insights to what motivates
these demands is the surprising finding that the demands for rewards
depend on the availability of punishments.
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1 Introduction
The importance of altruism and fairness can be seen in our everyday lives.
We seem to care about the unwritten social contract that kindness and
consideration should be shared, and we are often willing to pay to enforce
these ideals. For instance, every time we take a taxi or sit in a restaurant we
entrust our happiness to another person. If that trust is protected then we
may reward it with a generous tip, but if not we may punish by leaving less
than the usual, or nothing at all. Likewise we may shun unfriendly colleagues
but invite the friendly ones to our homes, and secretaries may perform more
promptly for those who are polite or bring gifts and less promptly for those
who are rude or unfriendly. Altruism, fairness and trust are often seen as
the lubricants that make the wheels of commerce move more smoothly. In
absence of complete contracts voluntary punishments and rewards are often
the mechanisms we use to sustain cooperation.
Social scientists have grown increasingly interested in individuals’ con-
cerns for others, or what economists frequently refer to as other-regarding
preferences. Sociologists and political scientists, for instance, have incorpo-
rated these into models of social cohesion; anthropologists and development
economists have linked them to market organization and economic growth;
evolutionary psychologists have looked for the roots of these behaviors in
our genetic history; and game theorists have developed abstract models of
altruism and fairness in strategic interactions. All of this research is ul-
timately aimed at designing institutions that can harness other-regarding
behavior to improve social well-being.
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In economics, much of the interest in this topic has been driven by eco-
nomic laboratory experiments. In static allocation games, there is a great
deal of evidence that many individuals have an altruistic desire to share a
surplus with others. Moreover, individual attitudes toward fairness are very
heterogeneous–some individuals are perfectly selfish while others seem to
have a strong aversion to inequality.1 In sequential games, our understand-
ing of preferences and motives is far less clear. Many studies show that
individuals are clearly willing to reward those who share and to punish
those who have not shared enough. Sometimes adding these rewards and
punishments results in greater efficiency, although often not.2 But pref-
erences for rewards and punishments have not always appeared consistent
across different experiments, and theoretical models that have predicted well
in static settings are often not successful in dynamic settings. Thus, there
seems to be a clear need for a literature that looks specifically at general
features of preferences in sequential games when the second-mover can re-
ward or punish a first-mover. Studying such games will help us understand
the reciprocal second-stage responses, and inform the broader literature on
other-regarding preferences.
In this paper we begin a systematic look at both punishments and re-
wards and their effect on cooperation in economic laboratory experiments.3
1See Andreoni and Miller (2002) for a discussion of this literature.
2To keep the exposition simple we will refer in two-stage games to a punishment as
a decrease in payoff that a second-stage player imposes on a first-stage player. Similarly
we refer to a reward as an increase in payoffs at the second stage. As examples of pun-
ishments see Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982), Forsyth, Horowitz, Savin, and
Sefton (1994), Bolton and Zwick (1995), Fehr and Gächter (2000), and Andreoni, Castillo
and Petrie (2000). Examples of a demand for rewards are Berg, Dickhaut, and Mc-
Cabe (1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), Charness
(1996), Charness and Haruvy (1999), Charness, Haruvy, and Sonsino (2000).
3To our knowledge we are the first to study these questions in a simple proposer-
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We study a series of two-person proposer-responder games with costly pun-
ishments and rewards. Proposers choose how much to share of a fixed pie.
Responders are in one of four conditions: punish or reward, reward only,
punish only, or neither. By considering two-person games we avoid free-
riding on punishments by others, and by randomly changing partners we
avoid any repeated game effects. By looking at rewards and punishments
both separately and jointly we can identify any interaction or complemen-
tarity.
We find substantial demands for both rewards and punishments. As
expected, an increase in the offer by proposers, on average, decreases the
punishment and increases the reward. Interestingly, while the average de-
mand for punishment appears to be independent of the reward option, we
find that the demand for rewards is significantly larger when the responder
doesn’t have the option of punishing. We also find that, on average, the pro-
posed offer is largest when a combination of rewards and punishments are
available, and smallest when neither option is available. Although the av-
erage offer of the rewards-only treatment exceeds that of punishments-only,
we find that rewards are much less effective in moving the proposers away
from the minimum possible offer. This suggests that the absence of a reward
is not equivalent to a punishment. Thus designing an institution around re-
wards only and omitting an option for punishments may be a mistake, even
if in the end the punishments are rarely used.
responder setting. Dickinson (1999) examines a team production problem where subjects
may be exogenously rewarded or punished. He finds that this mechanism increases effi-
ciency. Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2000) examine repeated linear public goods games and
find that combined use of rewards and punishments result in the most generous public good
contributions. In sequential public goods games Andreoni, Brown, and Vesterlund (1999)
find that subjects punish small contributions but seldom reward generous contributions.
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In the next section we provide a theoretical framework for the study. We
present the experimental design in Section 3 and the results in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the implications of the findings and concludes the paper.
2 Background
A number of experiments examine the effects of either rewards or punish-
ments. In this paper we limit our attention to two-player games where a
proposer and responder must split a pie of size Π. The proposer first of-
fers the responder a division (πP ,πR) such that aRπR + aPπP = Π, where
aR > 0 and aP > 0. Having observed the offer the responder, at a cost
to himself, may punish or reward the proposer by choosing a vector (p, r),
where the costs per unit are, respectively, cp > 0 and cr > 0. The final
payoffs of the game are (wP , wR) = (πP + r− p,πR− cpp− crr). Thus, each
game γ can be characterized by the parameters (aP , aR,Π, cp, cr )̇, and the
standard subgame perfect equilibrium prediction for this type of game is
simple and independent of the parameters: for all πR the responder chooses
(p, r) = (0, 0), and the proposer offers πR = 0 or some minimum required
transfer.
Most prior work on proposer-responder games of this type have allowed
the responder to either punish or reward the proposer, but not both.4 We
can easily incorporate such games in our framework by denoting the cost of
the excluded action as infinite. Notice, however, that excluding one or even
both of the responder’s options does not change the equilibrium prediction.
4One exception is Offerman (2000) who examines a proposer-responder game where a
proposer chooses between a hurtful or a helpful action, and the responder must select one
of three possible payoffs: a cool response, a reward, or a punishment.
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Experimental results have not confirmed this prediction. For exam-
ple, in the frequently-studied $10 dictator game, where (aP , aR,Π, cp, cr) =
(1, 1, 10,∞,∞), the average offer is often found to be 25%.5 In the ultima-
tum game, the responder is given an option of rejecting the proposer’s offer,
which decreases both payoffs to zero. If we restrict p to equal either 0 or
πP , then the $10 ultimatum game has the parameters (aP , aR,Π, cp, cr) =
(1, 1, 10, πRπP ,∞). Studies commonly find average offers of about 40% of the
pie, and that responders are more likely to reject low than high offers. While
rejections in the ultimatum game are evidence of punishments, the game is
not well suited for studying the demand for punishments. First, the respon-
der’s choice set is not convex–one can only accept or reject the offer–thus a
lot of information on preferences is lost.6 Second, when an offer is increased
it increases both the perceived generosity and the cost of punishing, making
it difficult disentangle the two influences on demands for punishment.
In games that offer options for rewards we also see evidence of positive
demands for these. For example, in the trust game the proposer and the
responder are each endowed with $10, and the proposer is asked to make
an offer to the responder. For every dollar transferred the responder re-
ceives three dollars, hence aP = 1 and aR = 1/3. The responder may
subsequently return any of the money received to the proposer, therefore if
we restrict πR ≥ 10 the trust game is described by the following parame-
5See for example Forsythe, et al. (1994). Andreoni and Miller (2002) compare a se-
ries of games (aP , aR,Π,∞,∞), which enables them to determine demands for πR =
f(aP , aR,Π).
6This may be one of the reasons why most fairness models are consistent with the
evidence from the ultimatum game (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, Fehr and Schmidt,
1999, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998, Falk and Fischbacher, 1998, and Rabin, 1997).
See Andreoni, et al. (2000) for an analysis of the convex ultimatum game.
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ters: (aP , aR,Π, cp, cr) = (1, 1/3, 403 ,∞, 1). In the original investigation of
the trust game by Berg, et al. (1995) proposers pass an average of $5.16,
and responders return an average of $4.66. Furthermore there is a positive
correlation between the amount sent and the amount returned.
Taken together these results show that responders are willing to punish
and reward, and that an increase in the initial offer, πR, generally causes
a decrease in punishments and an increase in rewards. Unfortunately these
studies are not well suited for determining the demands. In some studies,
the offer itself changes other parameters of the game, and even when these
are held constant it is generally the case that only one game is examined,
thus we are unable to determine what other factors may affect the demand
for punishments and rewards.7
In this paper we report results from an experiment designed to iden-
tify some of the factors that affect demands for rewards and punishments.
By studying rewards and punishments separately and jointly we can deter-
mine the possible interaction between the two. Furthermore by including a
treatment where the responder can neither punish nor reward we can also
determine precisely how these tools affect the proposer’s initial offer.
3 Experimental Design
We consider four variations of the general class of games described above. In
the first stage of each variation a proposer decides what portion of $2.40 he
wants to transfer to the responder; where aR = aP = 1. The only difference
7Another example where the cost of punishing is dependent on the level of cooperation
is Fehr and Gächter (1998). In their examination of the public goods game, subsequent
punishments are a percentage of the individual’s payoff, thus it is cheaper to punish those
who are less generous.
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between the four treatments is in the responder’s ability to punish or reward
at the second stage. We refer to the treatments as: Dictator, Carrot-Stick,
Carrot, and Stick. In the Dictator treatment the responder can neither
punish nor reward. In the Carrot-Stick treatment the responder can at a
cost of one cent increase or decrease the proposer’s earnings by 5 cents. In
the Stick treatment the responder can at a cost of one cent decrease the
proposer’s earnings by 5. Finally, in the Carrot treatment the responder
can at a cost of one cent increase the proposer’s earnings by 5 cents.8













Figure 1: Possible Payoffs in the Carrot-Stick
The set of payoff combinations that are available in the Carrot-Stick
game is illustrated in Figure 1. The proposer’s payoff is measured on the
horizontal axis and the responder’s payoff on the vertical axis. The proposer
chooses an offer along the bold solid line, and conditional on that offer the
responder has the option of choosing any point on the reward and punish-
ment lines originating at the proposer’s offer. These choices are indicated by
8Using the notation from before, the parameters of the Dictator treatment
are (aP , aR,Π, cp, cr) = (1, 1, 2.40,∞,∞); Carrot-Stick: (1, 1, 2.40, 1/5, 1/5); Carrot:
(1, 1, 2.40,∞, 1/5); and Stick: (1, 1, 2.40, 1/5,∞).
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the lighter solid lines. To secure the responder the opportunity of decreasing
the proposer’s payoff to zero, we do not allow the proposer to make offers
below 40 cents. The dashed portion of the bold line shows the proposals
excluded by this rule.
The 45◦-line, shown with light dashes, indicates the possible payoff com-
binations that result in equal payoffs to the responder and proposer. While
the responder decreases her payoff by choosing any outcome off of the bold
line, note that moves into areas I and III result in a more equal distribution
of payoffs than under the original proposal. We refer to responders who
choose outcomes in these two areas as equalizers. In contrast, subjects who
pick outcomes in areas II and IV could have chosen an outcome which both
resulted in a larger personal payoff as well as a more equal distribution of
payoffs.
The feasible payoff combinations in the Carrot treatment include all
points on or to the right of the bold line, the Stick treatment include points
on or to the left of the bold line, while the Dictator treatment only includes
points on the bold line. If it is common knowledge that all individuals seek
to maximize their personal payoff, then the subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome is the same for all treatments. The responder should neither reward
nor punish, and given this response the proposer should choose the minimum
required transfer of $0.40.
We ran three sessions of each treatment, each with 10 proposers and 10
responders, for a total of 30 subjects in each role in each treatment. Sub-
jects were undergraduate business students and were randomly assigned to
a treatment. Upon arriving to the experiment they were randomly assigned
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to a computer terminal and were given a set of written instructions. The ex-
perimenter read the instructions aloud, after which the subjects were asked
to calculate the payoffs in a specific example of the game. The answers
to the quiz were collected, and the example was reviewed verbally by the
experimenter. Half of the subjects were then randomly assigned to be pro-
posers and half to be responders. They remained in that role throughout
the experiment.
They played 10 iterations of the game. In each iteration they were ran-
domly and anonymously paired with another subject, with the stipulation
that no one played another subject more than once. Subjects’ identities
were never revealed to one another. After the 10 rounds, subjects’ earnings
for all 10 rounds were tallied and added to a $5 show-up payment. While
waiting for their payment, subjects answered a questionnaire. They were
paid anonymously with cash in envelopes which were handed out by subject
number. The experiment typically lasted less than an hour, and including
the show-up fee the average earnings were $17.41 (standard deviation of 4.80,
maximum of $49.35, and minimum of $6.70).9 A copy of the instructions
for the Carrot-Stick game can be found in the Appendix. The instructions
were kept as neutral as possible by referring to the punishments and rewards
simply as changes to the proposer’s payoff.
9The subject with the highest earnings was a proposer in the Carrot treatment. That
subject made generous offers and received total rewards of $36. The subject with the lowest
earnings was a proposer in the Stick treatment. This subject never made an offer below
200, and indicated in the questionnaire that her main objective was to avoid punishments.
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4 Results
In this section we first examine whether the observed behavior is consistent
with the standard subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. Next we examine
how the responder’s options affect the cooperative behavior of the proposer,
and discuss the demands for rewards and punishments. Finally, we examine














Dictator Carrot Stick Carrot-Stick
Figure 2: Average Offers
4.1 Equilibrium Predictions
Figure 2 shows the average offers in each of the ten rounds for the four
treatments. In each treatment and in each of the ten rounds we reject the
hypothesis that the average offer equals 40 cents.10 Furthermore offers are
10Treating each proposer as an observation we test if the average proposal equals 40.
Across the ten rounds the t-statistic is 12.6 for Carrot, 10.7 for Carrot-Stick, 9.6 for Stick,
and 8.0 for Dictator. The results for the last round and the last five rounds are similar.
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not independent of treatment. The average offer is largest in the Carrot-
Stick treatment and smallest in the Dictator treatment.11 As expected the
offers do not decrease towards the end of the experiment, indicating that
the proposers correctly understood the one-shot nature of the interactions.
Next we turn to the responders’ decisions. Here we find statistically
significant evidence of both punishments and rewards.12 In fact the willing-
ness to reward and punish is quite substantial. Across the three treatments
responders changed the proposer’s payoff 43 percent of the time, and over
the ten rounds 80 percent of the responders chose at least one change of the
proposer’s payoff. During the last five rounds, 75 percent of the responders
changed the proposer’s payoff.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of offers that were either increased or
decreased by the responder in a given round, and the responder’s expendi-
tures on changing the proposer’s payoff.13 Once again we observe differences
across treatments.14 During the last five rounds the average responder in the
11Treating each proposer as an observation, we use a t-test to determine if average
offers differ across treatments. Differences are significant at the five-percent level for the
ten rounds, at the ten-percent level for the last five rounds, and with exception of the
Dictator-Stick comparison at the ten-percent level for the last round.
12For all three treatments we reject the hypothesis that rewards and/or punishments
are zero. Treating each responder as an observation we test if responders on average chose
not to change the proposer’s payoff. Over the ten rounds the t-statistic is 4.6 for Carrot,
7.5 for Carrot-Stick, and 5.9 for Stick. The results for the last round and the last five
rounds are similar.
13Given random matching and a heterogeneous population one should expect some
variation in these numbers. Suppose for example that there are two types of people,
equal-dividers and free-riders. Free-riders never change the payoff and always offer 40,
equal-dividers always offer 120, and as responders they choose a change that equalizes
the payoff of the two participants. If free-riders are matched with free-riders and equal-
dividers with equal-dividers, then the average change of proposer’s payoff is zero. However
if subjects are matched with their opposites, then the average change is 100.
14Note neither the likelihood nor the expenditure on changes decreases over time. This
suggests that both proposers and responders behaved in a manner consistent with the one-
shot interaction. This contrasts with the repeated game result of Sefton, et al. (2000).
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Carrot treatment spends 20.4 cents changing the proposer’s payoff. In com-
parison, the number in the Carrot-Stick is 14.7, and in the Stick treatment


































Figure 3: Average Responses
15Over all ten rounds the average cost of changing payoffs are 14.7 in Carrot, 13.3 in
Carrot-Stick, and 5.7 in Stick. Treating each responder as an observation we test for treat-
ment differences. The t-statistic is 0.35 for the Carrot and Carrot-Stick comparison, 2.68
for the Carrot and Stick comparison, and 3.75 for the Carrot-Stick and Stick comparison.
The results for the last round and the last five rounds are similar.
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Given the significance of both rewards and punishments, we next ask
how this affected payoffs across the conditions. Table 1 shows that the
proposer’s payoff is largest in the Carrot treatment, and the responder’s
payoff is largest in the Carrot-Stick treatment. By design the average joint
payment of the Dictator treatment equals 240, however that is not the case
in the other treatments. In the Carrot treatment the proposer and responder
jointly receive 298 cents per round. In comparison the joint payment is 249
in the Carrot-Stick treatment and only 206 in the Stick treatment.16 There
are also substantial differences in the relative payoffs to the proposer and
responder. Relatively speaking the payoffs are more equally distributed in
the Carrot-Stick treatment, and most unequal in the Carrot treatment.
Table 1: Average Per-Period Earnings, in Cents
All Ten Rounds Last Five Rounds
Treatment Proposer Responder Proposer Responder
Carrot-Stick 126 123 123 132
Carrot 199 99 224 98
Stick 115 91 116 89
Dictator 158 82 158 82
Next we examine these treatment differences more closely. First, we de-
termine how the availability of punishments or rewards affects the proposer’s
offer to the responder.
16With exception of the Carrot-Stick versus Dictator comparison the sum of payoffs
differ across treatments. Treating each responder as an observation all differences are
significant at the five-percent level over the ten rounds. Similar results are found for the
last five rounds, where the joint payoff in Carrot is 321, and only 254 and 205 in the
Carrot-Stick and Stick treatments respectively. In the last round the difference between
the Carrot-Stick and Carrot treatment is not significant.
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4.2 Cooperation Production Function
We saw in Figure 2 that the proposers’ offers differ across treatments, with
Carrot-Stick offers the highest (136 on average), followed by Carrot (114),
then Stick (97) and Dictator (82).17 This seems to indicate that punish-
ments alone are the least effective in moving the proposer away from the
minimum possible offer. However, when examining the distribution of offers
we find a much more subtle and interesting relationship between rewards,
punishments and cooperation.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of offers over the last five rounds. Notice
that the modes of the distributions differ substantially across treatments.
The most frequent offer in the Dictator is 40, the minimum possible. Adding
just rewards leaves the modal offer at 40, but greatly increases the variance
in offers. A sizable minority of people, 10 percent, actually share every-
thing by offering 240 (and hence raise the average in this treatment). But,
except for this small group of generous individuals, most of the proposers
actually behave as in the dictator game. This indicates that for most sub-
jects, rewards alone are not effective. The Stick treatment, however, moves
the behavior dramatically. The modal offer is now 120, with virtually no
offers above 120. Hence, punishments can move people from the selfish to
the equitable offer. Finally, the Carrot-Stick has a substantial effect, fur-
ther increasing the mode all the way to 240, the maximum possible offer.
Overall, the distribution of offers in the Carrot-Stick treatment first-order
stochastically dominates that of the three other treatments. Thus, while
17The data for the last five rounds is similar, with 146 for Carrot-Stick, 118 for Carrot,
95 for Stick, and 82 for Dictators.
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adding rewards only had little effect, adding rewards to punishments has a
profound effect. In other words, rewards and punishments seem to act as





















































Figure 4: Distribution of Offers for Last 5 Rounds
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4.3 Demands for Punishments and Rewards
Punishments and rewards are common. More than half of the offers in
excess of 120 result in an increase in the proposer’s payoff, and more than
40 percent of the offers below 120 result in a decrease in the proposer’s
payoff.18 In this section we examine how these punishments and rewards
differ with proposals as well as with the treatment.
Look first at punishments in the Carrot-Stick and Stick treatments. The
demands for punishments during the last five rounds are shown in Figure
5. First note that the average punishment decreases with the size of the
proposer’s offer. This is similar to the ultimatum game, where the cost of
punishing is not independent of the offer. Second, the decrease in punish-
ment is rather steep–after the equal split there are essentially no punish-
ments. Of the offers of 120 approximately 15% result in some decrease in
the proposers payoff.19 Finally, the responder’s ability to reward has limited
effect on the demand for punishments.20 The punishments of medium-sized
offers are the same across treatment, and although the punishments of low
18Across all ten periods the proportion of offers above 120 that are rewarded is 54 percent
in the Carrot and 59 percent in the Carrot-Stick. Of offers below 120 the proportion
rewarded is 31 percent in Carrot and 11 percent in Carrot-Stick. Of offers below 120 the
proportion punished is 43 percent in the Stick and 51 percent in the Carrot-Stick, and of
offers above 120 the proportion punished is 8 percent in the Stick and 2 percent in the
Carrot-Stick.
19During the last five rounds the proportion of 120-offers punished is 17% in the Stick
and 13% in the Carrot-Stick.
20We use a conservative approach to labeling observations as censored when testing if the
demand for punishment depend on the availability of rewards. We denote any observation
that results in zero payoffs to the proposer, and any observation where the responder
chose not to change the proposer’s payoffs as censored. Using a random effects model for
censored data we regress the truncated demand for punishments on the offer, a dummy
for the Stick treatment, and an interaction between the two, and account for censoring
as described above. Looking across all ten rounds, or just the last five rounds, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the demands for punishments are the same across treatments.
As expected an increase in the proposer’s offer significantly decreases punishments.
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offers appear larger in the Carrot-Stick treatment, this difference is only
significant at the end of the experiment.21 This finding is surprising. One
would not expect rewards of small offers, yet it is for small offers that the



















Figure 5: Average Punishments for Last 5 Rounds
Next we examine the demand for rewards in the Carrot-Stick and Carrot
treatments. The demands for rewards in the last five rounds are shown in
Figure 6. Similar to the evidence from the trust game, a higher offer on
average leads to a larger reward. But the data reveal a result which one may
not have expected based on the results from trust games: average rewards at
or below equal-split offers are quite substantial.22 Another puzzling finding
is the substantial difference in the demand for rewards between the Carrot
21Counting each responder as an observation we test if the option of rewarding increases
average punishments of low offers. Across the last five rounds the p-value of the test is
0.21, and for the last round the p-value is 0.10. Note that in each of the last five rounds
the punishment of low offers exceeds that observed in absence of rewards.
22Such choices cannot be revealed in the trust game, where all transfers result in the
responder receiving more than half the pie.
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and Carrot-Stick treatments.23 Conditional on the offer, the average reward
given in the Carrot treatment is larger than in the Carrot-Stick treatment.24
Even for very large offers, where we know there is no demand for punishment,


















Figure 6: Average Rewards for Last 5 Rounds
While punishments are unaffected by the availability of rewards, we find
that the rewards are larger when there is no option of punishing. Note that
23To determine if the responders’ demands for rewards change when punishments are
available, we take a conservative approach to labeling observations as censored. We denote
any observation that results in zero payoffs to the responder, and any observation where
the responder chose not to change the proposer’s payoffs as censored. Using a random
effects model we regress the truncated demand for rewards on the offer, a dummy for the
Carrot treatment, and an interaction term between the two, and account for censoring as
described above. The joint hypothesis that there is no effect from the punishment option
is rejected with a p-value of 0.04 over the ten rounds, and 0.03 over the last five rounds.
As expected an increase in the proposer’s offer significantly increases rewards.
24Treating each responder as an observation we test if the average reward is larger in
the Carrot. The p-values for the last five rounds and for each of the seven offer ranges are
from smallest offer to largest: 0.04, 0.30, 0.07, 0.03, 0.12, 0.17, and 0.05. The insignificant
results are generally found for offers where there are fewer observations.
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it is the combination of these results that makes them puzzling. If one were
presented simply with the reward results, then it might be tempting to argue
that the difference is caused by a simple substitution effect. Suppose that
rewards and punishments are viewed as substitutes, then it may be that the
demand for either one is decreasing in own cost and increasing in the cost
of the other input, i.e., ∂p∂cp < 0 and
∂p
∂cr
> 0, and similarly ∂r∂cr < 0 and
∂r
∂cp
> 0. If a particular offer is perceived in a similar way across treatments,
then excluding one of these substitutable tools simply suggests that rewards
should be larger in the Carrot than in the Carrot-Stick treatment, rC(πR) >
rCS(πR). That is, if subjects are limited to only using one of two tools,
then they may use the available tool more. In contrast to our experimental
evidence, this also implies that the demands for punishments will be larger in
the Stick than in the Carrot-Stick treatment, pS(πR) > pCS(πR). Therefore
a simple substitution argument cannot explain the combined results.
To summarize, holding cost constant we see the expected result that an
increase in the proposer’s transfer on average decreases the punishment and
increases the reward. But we also see three unexpected results. First, the
rewards of small offers are substantial; second, rewards are larger when there
is no punishment option; and third, the reward option has little effect on the
demand for punishments. To shed light on what motivates these demands
we will next examine the distribution of final payoffs and determine whether
recent fairness models can help explain our findings.
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Figure 7: Final Payoff Distribution for Last 5 Rounds
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4.4 Understanding Motives for Rewards and Punishments
The substantial demand for rewards and punishments clearly demonstrates
that subjects are not selfish, subgame perfect money-maximizers. What
does our study suggest motivates these demands? The recent literature on
fairness has suggested that individuals may benefit from getting close to
some individual reference point for a preferred distribution of payoffs. If
their current payoff standing is inferior to the reference point then they may
wish to decrease the payoffs of others, while if it is superior to the reference
point then they may prefer to increase the payoffs of others.
One way of assessing motives is to examine the payoff distributions in
the Carrot, Stick, and Carrot-Stick treatments. Figure 7 shows the payoffs
during the last five rounds in each of the three treatments. The bold line
illustrates the set of possible proposals, and the thin lines illustrate the
possible changes that the responders can choose when given a particular
proposal. The circles illustrate the observations, where the area of the circle
shows the number of observations as indicated by the key. Circles on the
right edge of the figure indicate observations where the proposer’s payoff
exceeds $4.00.
In the Carrot-Stick treatment, 90 percent of responders chose to either
punish or reward at least one time, and 60 percent of all choices involved a
punishment or reward. We also observe a substantial number of responders
choosing outcomes that simultaneously decrease equality and decrease the
their personal payoff - areas II and IV of Figure 1. A total of 23 percent of
the observations during the last five rounds are in this area, corresponding to
more than half the subjects choosing at least one outcome which decreases
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both their absolute and relative payoffs.
The substantial treatment differences between the Carrot and Carrot-
Stick treatments are apparent when comparing the distributions of final
payoffs. Relative to the Carrot-Stick treatment, the Carrot treatment shows
much larger rewards overall, as well as larger rewards of low offers. Here
35 percent of all responses make relative payoffs more unequal, which cor-
responds to 70 percent of the subjects making at least one choice which
decreases both their absolute and relative payoffs.
Comparing the outcomes of the Stick and the Carrot-Stick treatments
reveals that more punishments in the Stick treatment result in a final out-
come where the responder’s payoff exceeds that of the proposer’s. Thus,
responses appear more extreme when only one tool is available.
Table 2 summarizes the extent to which equalizing payoffs may be a
motive of our subjects. This table assigns subjects into one of three groups.
First is responders who never changed the proposer’s offer. We refer to this
group as payoff maximizers. The second group consists of those who always
either chose no change or a change that increased equality, i.e., outcomes in
area I or III. We refer to this group as equalizers. The final group includes
those who chose at least one outcome that makes payoffs more unequal, i.e.,
areas II and IV.
Table 2 reveals that, in each treatment, only a minority of the responders
can be called equalizers, and the majority of subjects are often in the “other”
category. Perhaps surprisingly, this suggests that a model, in which the
motive or reference point is one of equal payoffs, will have difficulty capturing
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our results.25
Table 2: Categorizing Responders by Motives,
Percent of Subjects Per Condition
Types
Payoff Equalizers Others
Maximizers I and III II and IV
All ten rounds
Carrot 20 3 77
Carrot-Stick 7 20 73
Stick 33 23 43
Last five rounds
Carrot 23 7 70
Carrot-Stick 10 37 53
Stick 43 23 33
Other aspects of our findings may help point to a new direction. In par-
ticular, we find that the availability of punishments affects the demand for
rewards, which is a finding that simple models of inequality-aversion would
not predict. Another class of models looks at reciprocity, which suggest that
an intentionally kind act may be rewarded and an unkind act punished.26
Could these account for the result? Unfortunately, these models predict
that conditional on the offer the proposer’s kindness is independent of the
availability of rewards or punishments. Thus these models cannot explain
the differences in demands.
It appears that only a model which allows for changes in the refer-
ence point across the three different treatments will be able to capture the
puzzling interactions between rewards and punishments. The question is
25Examples of equity models are presented in Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman
(1989), Bolton (1991), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
26See for example Rabin(1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998).
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whether it is reasonable to assume that the reference point changes. In par-
ticular is it reasonable that the same offer be perceived differently across
treatments? It certainly appears as if different norms may be present in the
three games. For instance, in the Carrot-Stick treatment the offers first-
order stochastically dominate those of the other treatments. Thus, for any
given offer a larger fraction of offers exceed that offer in the Carrot-Stick
game than in any of the other games. As a result, the same offer may be
seen as less generous in the Carrot-Stick treatment than if it were made in
the Carrot or Stick treatment. All else equal, this would result in smaller
rewards and larger punishments in the Carrot-Stick treatment. Combined
with the substitutability arguments this suggests that two opposing factors
may be affecting the average demand for punishments. On one hand the ab-
sence of rewards may cause a substitution towards the punishment option,
and on the other hand the lack of rewards may imply that a given offer is
perceived as being more generous, suggesting less punishment. In contrast,
both of these effects suggest larger rewards when there is no punishment
option. Our findings are consistent with both of these effects.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the demands for rewards and punishments and their
effects on cooperation. We considered a simple proposer-responder envi-
ronment with randomly rematched partners. In this way, our experiment
allowed us to concentrate on the pure demands for rewards and punishments.
By considering four conditions–punish or reward, reward only, punish only,
and neither–we were able to identify the effect each has separately and
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jointly.
We find, first, and perhaps surprisingly, that rewards alone are relatively
ineffective in moving the modal offer away from the most selfish one pos-
sible. Second, punishments improved cooperation in that they eliminated
extremely selfish offers, pushing proposers in the Stick treatment to modest
degrees of cooperation. Combining rewards and punishments had a very
strong effect. In this Carrot-Stick treatment the modal offer was the most
generous one possible, often leading to rewards by responders. Even though
generous offers were not punished, such generosity was only reached when
the threat of punishments existed. This indicates that rewards and pun-
ishments act to complement one another and, even though only one can be
used at a time, the availability of both tools leads to the greatest degree of
cooperation.
In addition to this, we also found some surprising treatment effects in
the responders’ demands for rewards and punishments. While demands
for punishments are unaffected by the availability of a reward option, we
found that rewards are larger when there is no option of punishing. From
the perspective of current theoretical models of fairness, the combination
of these two findings is quite puzzling. An explanation may require that
the definition of kindness changes systematically by treatment. Given the
distribution of offers it may be that a particular offer is perceived as less
kind in the Carrot-Stick treatment, than in the other treatments. This result
suggests many productive areas for future research.
Finally, what do our results suggest about how fairness may shape eco-
nomic institutions? While more work clearly needs to be done, cooperation
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in our experiment is most successfully enforced in an environment in which
both punishments and rewards are available. The process suggested by our
data is that the stick can help by getting people to move away from perfect
selfishness and to test the waters of cooperation. The carrot can then take
over by encouraging further cooperation, rendering the stick a rarely used
but important and necessary tool. Our results show that when devising in-
centive systems it is important to recognize that the absence of a reward is
not equivalent to a punishment - it is important that both tools be present.
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This is an experiment about decision making.  The amount of money you earn will depend on
the decisions that you and the other participants make. The entire experiment should take less than an
hour, and at the end you will be paid privately and in cash for your decisions.  A research foundation
has provided the funds for this experiment.
Your Identity
Your identity is secret.  You will never be asked to reveal it to anyone during the course of the
experiment.  Your name will never be recorded by anyone.  Neither the experimenters nor the other
subjects will be able to link you to any of the decisions you make.  In order to keep your decisions
private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.
Claim Check
Attached to the top of this page is a yellow piece of paper with a number on it.  This is your
Claim Check.  Each participant has a different number.  We use claim checks to maintain secrecy about
your decisions, earnings, and identity.  You will present your Claim Check to an assistant at the end of
the experiment to receive your cash payment.
Please remove your claim check now, and put it in a safe place.
How you make money
You will make 10 separate decisions in this experiment. For each decision you will be randomly
paired with one other participant. Your earnings will depend on the decisions that you and the other
participant make.  
For each decision you will be randomly paired with a different participant. You will never play
against the same participant more than once. In each pair, one participant will be known as the
Proposer, and one participant will be known as the Responder. We will tell you at the start of the
experiment whether you will be a Proposer or a Responder. Your role will be the same throughout the
experiment.
Your decisions will be tallied by the computer. At the end of the experiment you will receive
your cash payment in a sealed envelope so that no one but you knows how much you have earned.
Please do not talk to other participants during the experiment.
This Experiment
The experiment takes place in two stages.  In the first stage the Proposer proposes a split of
$2.40 (240 cents) between the Proposer and the Responder.  When the Proposer has entered the
decision into the computer, the computer will randomly match the Proposer with a Responder.  The
Proposer’s choice will be revealed to the Responder.  The Responder will then choose to either
increase, decrease or make no change to the Proposer’s earnings.  It will cost the Responder to
change the Proposer’s earnings, as we will explain below. When the Responders have entered their
decisions this round is finished, and the computer calculates the earnings for the two participants. The
computer will inform you of the outcome of your decision. No one will be told the decisions or earnings
associated with pairs other than their own.
Proposal Stage
If you are a Proposer, you will propose an allocation of 240 cents between yourself and the
Responder.  You have to allocate at least 40 cents to the Responder. Remember that this proposal
may not be the final allocation: the Responder is able to either decrease or increase the Proposer’s
allocation in the second stage, if he or she wants to.  Once the Proposer has proposed a split of the
240 cents, the Responder can adjust Proposer’s Earnings.
Response Stage
The Responder determines how to respond to the proposed allocation of the Proposer.  There
are three basic choices: the Responder can increase, decrease, or make no change to the
Proposer’s earnings.  The responder has to pay a cost to adjust the Proposer’s earnings. 
That is the Responder must decide to do one  of the following:
(1) Make no change in the Proposer’s earnings, in which case the Proposer’s and the
Responder’s payoff are the same as in the proposed allocation.
(2) Increase the Proposer’s earnings, in which case the Responder’s payoff 
decreases by 1 cent for every 5 cent increase in the Proposer’s earnings.
(3) Decrease the Proposer’s earnings, in which case the Responder’s payoff 
decreases by 1 for every 5 cent decrease in the Proposer’s earnings.
Note that whether the Responder chooses to increase or decrease the Proposer’s earnings, it costs the
Responder 1 cent for each 5 cent change that he/she makes to the Proposer’s payoff.  Please see the
attached table for samples of the changes that you can make as a responder.
Sample Decisions
We will now go through an example to help you understand the experiment.  This example is meant to
improve your understanding, and is not intended to guide you toward making any particular decision. 
Example 1:
Suppose the Proposer offers to keep 120 cents and give 120 cents to the Responder.  In response to
this offer the Responder decides to increase the Proposer’s payoff by 90 cents. It costs the Responder
1 cent for each 5 cent increase in the Proposer’s earnings, hence this decision will cost the Responder
90/5 = 18 cents, and the Responder’s earnings are 120-18 = 102 cents ($1.02).  The Proposer’s
earnings are 120 + 90 = 210 cents ($2.10)
Example 2:
Suppose once again that the Proposer offers to keep 120 cents and give 120 cents to the Responder,
however the Responder now decides to decrease the Proposer’s payoff by 90 cents. It costs the
Responder 1 cent for each 5 cent decrease in the proposer’s earnings, hence this decision will cost the
Responder 90/5 = 18 cents, and the Responder’s earnings are 120 - 18 = 102 cents ($1.02).  The
Proposer’s earnings are 120-90 = 30 cents ($0.30)
Example 3:
Finally, suppose the Responder makes no change to the 120 cent offer.  In this case the Proposer’s
earnings are 120 cents, and the Responder’s earnings are 120 cents.
A Brief Review of the Experiment
You will be either a Proposer or a Responder.  The Proposer makes a proposal to split the 240 cents,
allocating a certain number to him or herself and the rest to the Responder.  The Responder then gets a
chance to change the Proposer’s offer.  The Responder can increase, decrease, or make no change
to the Proposer’s payoff.  Every 5 cent change the Responder makes to the Proposer’s allocation
reduces the Responder’s own allocation by 1 cent.  The Responder’s change, if any, is final and
determines how much money both people get.  
To make sure that you understand these instructions we will now ask you to fill out a brief quiz.  Please
be sure that the claim check number on your quiz is the same as that on your claim check.
